This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit 'excessive'risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be e¤ectively computable and can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyse …nancial fragility. Financial fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other results, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral e¤ects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may a¤ect …nancial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-o¤ between …nancial stability and economic e¢ ciency.
Introduction
It is a truism that the structure of a model needs to re ‡ect the practical purposes which drive the research in the …rst place. In our case, we work for the Financial Stability wing of the Bank of England; our aim is to construct a model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit 'excessive' risktaking.
In order to reduce a model of the aggregate economy to manageable proportions, a common simpli…cation is to assume that each sector has agents which behave identically, so that they can be presented in 'representative agent' format as in Lucas (1990) and Lucas and Stokey (1987) . So, in most models the banking system is represented by a single agent, which can either be viewed as a set of perfectly competitive identical banks, or, on occasions, as a single, monopolistic bank.
While the representative agent approach has many uses and advantages, applying it to the banking system inevitably obscures many of the economic and behavioural relationships, notably between banks, in which a regulatory authority is closely interested. For example, with a single 'representative'bank, there can be no interbank market. Again, either the whole banking system, as represented by the one agent, fails, or the whole banking system survives in the face of some assumed shock. Typically in reality individual banks have di¤ering portfolios, often re ‡ecting di¤ering risk/return preferences. So, typically, failures occur with the greatest probability amongst the riskiest banks. Such failures in turn generate interactions in the system more widely that may threaten the survival of other banks, a process of contagion. This may have several channels, both in interbank relationships more directly, and via changes in asset market ‡ows and prices that may involve other sectors, e.g. persons and companies. Such interactions can hardly be studied in a model with a single representative bank, since many of these interactions, e.g. the interbank market, are ruled out by de…nition.
The present model is based on the model introduced by Tsomocos (2003a, b) which incorporated heterogeneous commercial banks and capital requirements in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets, money and default. However, we depart by introducing the possibility of capital requirements'violation and consequent penalties and a secondary market for the banks'equity. Moreover, we introduce limited access to consumer credit markets, thus allowing for di¤erent interest rates across the commercial banking sector. Finally, we simplify the model by removing the intratemporal loan markets and allow only for intertemporal borrowing and lending.
These modi…cations are necessary for the analysis of …nancial fragility. In particular, it allows one to assess the role and impact of capital requirements for the soundness of the …nancial system and the macroeconomy. Indeed, it is important for crisis management and prevention to study situations where banks'capital depletes and capital requirements are 'biting'. Thus, the tradeo¤ between default and capital requirements'regulation can be systematically examined. The presence of a secondary market for banks'equity allows us to investigate how the collapse of banks'equity value a¤ects …nancial fragility, and also sheds light on the …nancial structure of the banking sector. Finally, the presence of multiple credit and deposit markets leads to di¤erent loan rates among various banks and also between loan and deposit rates. This in turn streamlines the channels of contagion operating in our model and highlights the systemic importance of individual banks.
Our model incorporates a number of heterogeneous commercial banks, each of which is distinguished by a unique risk/return preference. Since each bank is, and is roughly perceived as being, di¤erent, it follows that there is not a single market either for bank loans or bank deposits. 1 Instead, we assume that there is a separate market, with di¤ering interest rates, in each case. We also allow individual non-bank agents to di¤er, with di¤ering utility functions, and, hence di¤ering attitudes towards potential bankruptcy; we also model in their case the incentives for avoiding bankruptcy, as we do in the case of the banks. Again we assume that the banks can observe the agents'di¤ering riskiness with noise. This means that each borrower faces a di¤erent credit market. If each bank had its own individual, idiosyncratic information on each borrower, then if there were H borrowers and B banks, there would be H!B! (H 1)!(B 1)! bilateral markets for borrowing. If we assume, instead, that each bank has the same information on each borrower, an implausible assumption, then competition between banks would mean that there would be H separate markets. Alternatively, we can assume that borrowers have been pre-allocated at time t=0 to a particular bank, and that that allocation provides each respective bank with specialised information; such additional information allows them, for asymmetric information standard reasons, to lend cheaper than any other bank. Consequently there are B separate credit markets between each bank and a subset of borrowers that were initially randomly allocated. 2 This means that, instead of a single market for deposits/loans, we have multiple markets for deposits (by separate bank) and for loans (by borrower and bank). Given the optimising conditions for the individual banks, after assuming an initial allocation of capital, the open market operations of the Central Bank, etc., etc., deposits may not be su¢ cient in each individual bank (plus capital), to …nance that bank's asset portfolio (of cash, loans and Central Bank (public sector) debt), although within the banking sector as a whole outside liabilities must equal outside assets, and interest rates and/or cash ‡ows adjust until that happens. So, de…cit (surplus) banks borrow (lend) on the interbank market. In reality the interbank market is also segmented with banks of di¤ering riskiness either borrowing at di¤erent rates, or facing limited 'caps' on such borrowing. At this stage in our exercise, however, we shall assume a single, undi¤erentiated interbank market with a common interest rate.
Since our focus is on …nancial fragility, the governance (public sector) institutions which we introduce are a …nancial regulator and a Central Bank; these two may, or may not, be the same institution, but will be assumed to cooperate where necessary. We abstract from …scal policy. The …nancial regulator sets the penalties/incentives on bankruptcy in both the banking and the non-banking private sector, and also the required (minimum) capital adequacy ratios.
The Central Bank is established at time t = 0 with an allocation of (public sector, safe, …xed nominal value) debt as its assets. Against this it has as its liabilities cash, commercial banks reserve deposits and Central Bank debt. Reserve deposits and Central Bank debt are held by the commercial banks only, in an initial allocation, against an equivalent initial allocation of capital. Central Bank open market operations exchange its own (interest-bearing) debt for (non-interest bearing) deposits. Moreover, the Central Bank can lend, or borrow, in the interbank market.
In principle the non-bank public can insist on converting its commercial bank deposits into currency or into Central Bank deposits. It is this convertibility commitment that forces commercial banks to hold Central Bank deposits. Again we assume an initial allocation of Central Bank cash to the public, and model the public's choice between (safe) cash, which is non-interest-bearing, and deposits, which are risky but interest-bearing, and can be used for expenditures, and other risky (non-liquid) aspects.
The closest precursor to this approach is the work of Shapley and Shubik (1977) , Shubik (1973) and Shubik (1999) who introduced a central bank in a strategic market game. Shubik (1973) also emphasised the virtues of explicitly modeling each transaction (see also Grandmont (1983), Grandmont and Laroque (1975) , Younes (1972 and 1973) who introduced a banking sector into general equilibrium with overlapping generations). The commercial banking sector follows closely Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) . The modeling of money in an incomplete markets framework is akin to a series of models developed by Geanakoplos (1992, 2003a, b) and by Drèze and Polemarchakis (2000) , Bloise, Drèze, and Polemarchakis (2004) , and Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2004) . Finally, default is modelled as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2004) , Shubik (1973) , and Shubik and Wilson (1977) , namely by subtracting a linear term from the objective function of the defaulter proportional to the debt outstanding. 3 However, none of the previous papers combines all the three ingredients (money, default, and incomplete asset markets), incorporates a commercial bank sector and interbank market, and focuses on …nancial fragility.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we set out the basic form of the model. In sections 3 and 4, we formally de…ne the budget sets of the non-bank public, commercial banks and Monetary Equilibrium with Commercial Banks and Default (MECBD). In section 5, we show under which conditions a MECBD is achieved. Thus in a MECBD positive default and …nancial fragility are compatible with the orderly functioning of markets. So, given default and …nancial vulnerability, there is room for economic policy to improve upon the ensuing ine¢ ciencies.
A formal de…nition of …nancial fragility is proposed in section 6, borrowed from Tsomocos (2003a and 2003b) . Also, a Keynesian liquidity trap holds in equilibrium in which commodity prices stay bounded whereas the volume of trade in the asset markets tends to in…nity whenever monetary policy is loosened. Regulatory policy is shown to be non-neutral. We address formally the Modigliani-Miller proposition and establish the conditions that cause its failure. In section 7, we note that Hicksian elements of the demand for money are active in equilibrium. We establish monetary non-neutrality that characterises the lack of the classical dichotomy between the real and nominal sectors of the economy. We also show that a non-trivial quantity theory of money holds and the liquidity structure of interest rates depends on aggregate liquidity and default in the economy.
Using the principles derived, we proceed in section 8 to analyse a concrete comparative statics change in computable general equilibrium models. Finally, we conclude in section 9 and all the proofs are relegated in the appendix.
This framework is more elaborate, but we believe that it also o¤ers new insights into the analysis of …nancial fragility and systemic risk. We doubt whether contemporaneous models, without heterogeneous agents, can adequately handle analyses relating to liquidity, default and contagion. After we gain experience with this model through parametric examples, we may possibly be able to derive our comparative statics results in a more general context.
The Model

The Economy
Consider the standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI) in which time extends over two time periods. The …rst period consists of a single initial state and the second period consists of S possible states. At t = 0, non-bank private sector (NBPS), commercial banks and the authorities take their decisions expecting (rationally) the realisation of any one of the S possible future scenarios to occur. At t = 1 one of the S states occurs and then again the economic actors take the appropriate decisions. A detailed explanation of the sequence of events is contained in section 2.3 and …gure 1. NBPS and commercial banks transact, maximising their respective objective functions, whereas the Central Bank and the regulator are modelled as 'strategic dummies' (i.e. their choices are exogenously …xed and are common knowledge to economic agents). NBPS trade in commodities, …nancial assets, consumer loans, deposits and shares of commercial banks. Commercial banks lend to the consumers and take deposits, they borrow and lend in the interbank market, invest in the asset market and issue equity in the primary market. The Central Bank operates in the interbank market via open market operations (OMOs). The regulator …xes the bankruptcy code for households and commercial banks exogenously and sets the capital-adequacy requirements for commercial banks.
Formally, the notation that will be used henceforth is as follows: t 2 T = f0; 1g = time periods, s 2 S = f1; :::; Sg 4 = set of states at t = 1, S = f0g [ fSg = set of all states, h 2 H = f1; :::; Hg = NBPS (set of economic agents, i.e. households/investors), b 2 B = f1; :::; Bg = set of commercial banks, l 2 L = f1; :::; Lg = set of commodities, R L + R SL + = commodity space indexed by f0; 1; :::; Sg f1; :::; Lg; e h 2 R L + R SL + = endowments of households, m h 2 R S + = monetary endowments of households, e b 2 R S + = capital endowments of commercial banks,
The standard assumptions hold:
(A1) 8s 2 S and l 2 L, P h2H e h sl > 0;
(i.e. every commodity is present in the economy).
(A2) 8s 2 S and h (b) 2 H (B); e h sl > 0 (e b sl > 0) for some l 2 L ; s 2 S ;
(i.e. no household (commercial bank) has the null endowment of commodities (capital) in every state of the world).
(A3) Let A be the maximum amount of any commodity sl that exists and let 1 denote the unit vector in R S L : Then 9Q > 0 3 u h (0; :::; Q; :::; 0) > u h (A1) for Q in an arbitrary component 4 It will be clear from the context whether S represents the set of states or its cardinality at t = 1:
(i.e. strict monotonicity in every component). 5 Also, continuity and concavity are assumed. A straightforward assumption is imposed.
(A4) Let A m be the maximum amount of money present in the economy and let 1 denote the unit vector in R S : Then 9Q > 0 3 u b (0; :::; Q; :::; 0) > u(A m 1) for Q in an arbitrary component.
(i.e. strict monotonicity in every component). 6 Also, continuity and concavity are assumed.
Central Bank and the Regulator
The Central Bank conducts OMOs in the interbank credit market (though it could also do so by buying, or selling, its own debt instruments).
Formally, the following vector gives the Central Bank's action Note that the Central Bank is not required to spend less than it borrows; the existence of equilibrium is compatible with the Central Bank printing money to …nance its expenditures. All the results hold for both cases (i.e. with or without money …nancing) except where otherwise stated. Also, the Central Bank may …x the interbank interest rate and then accommodate the ensuing money demand.
Similarly, the following vector gives the regulator's actions The risk weights may be functions of other macroeconomic variables such as aggregate default levels as in Caterineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2004) , interest rates, volumes of trade, prices, etc. Consumer loans are bank speci…c (see section 2.5) whereas the interbank credit market is an aggregate market where the Central Bank and all the commercial banks participate. Finally, since our focus is on formulating a framework for …nancial stability and not monetary policy, we have collapsed the interbank and the repurchase markets into one.
The Time Structure of Markets
At t = 0, the commodity, asset, equity, credit, deposit and interbank markets meet. At the end of the …rst period consumption and settlement (including any bankruptcy and capital requirements'violation penalties) take place.
At t = 1, commodity and equity markets meet again, loans, deposits and assets are delivered. At the end of the second period consumption and settlement for default and second period capital requirements' violations take place. Also, commercial banks are liquidated. Figure 1 makes the time line of the model explicit.
Asset Markets
The set of assets is J = f1; :::; Jg: Assets are promises sold by the seller in exchange for a price paid by the buyer today. They are traded at t = 0 and the contractual obligations are delivered at t = 1 for a particular state s 2 S. An asset j 2 J is denoted by a vector A j 2 R S(L+1) + indicating the collection of goods deliverable and the money at any future state s 2 S: Therefore, the asset market is summarised by an ((L + 1)S) J matrix A:
All the deliveries are made in money (outside cash or inside deposits/loans). When the assets promise commodities the seller delivers the money equivalent of the value of the agreed commodities at their spot prices in the relevant state.
Furthermore, we assume (A5) A j 6 = 0; 8j 2 J (i.e. no asset makes zero promises).
(A6) A j 0; 8j 2 J (i.e. asset payo¤s are non-negative).
Finally, note that agents do not hold positive endowments of assets and thus all sales of assets are e¤ectively short sales.
Individuals are price takers in asset markets, where j ; 8j 2 J; represents asset prices. Let b h j amount of money sent by h 2 H [ B in the market of asset j. Also, let q h j promises sold of asset j by agent h 2 H [ B. In equilibrium, at positive levels of trade, 0 < j < 1;
The volume of trade in the asset market is a¤ected by the overall liquidity of the economy. In this way monetary policy interacts with asset markets and in ‡uences asset prices (i.e. asset price in ‡ation channel).
Money, Credit, and Deposit Markets
Money is the stipulated means of exchange. All commodities can be traded for money, and (as noted) all asset deliveries are exclusively in money. Money can be either inside or outside …at (see Gurley and Shaw (1960) ). At the outset some individuals and banks hold net monetary assets-outside money-(which includes Central Bank liabilities). Inside money is credit created by the banking sector through the credit markets in period 0, in part depending on current monetary policy, and is matched by the individual borrowers' debt obligation to the banks. When the Central Bank undertakes expansionary OMOs, in the interbank market, the commercial banks gain cash reserve assets matched by an interbank deposit liability to the Central Bank. In turn, commercial banks lend to borrowers and accept deposits. This represents an asset of the commercial bank and thus a liability to investors. The net assets of the private sector as a whole remain unchanged. Cash-in-advance is required for any purchase.
A market involves a symmetric exchange between two instruments. Just as agents cannot sell money which they do not have in a market, so in the model agents cannot sell commodities they do not have. The only exceptions are assets, credit and deposit markets, where we allow agents to write their own promises (bonds).
Money enters the economy in three ways. First, it may be present at the outset (t = 0) in the private endowments of agents and commercial banks. Agent h 2 H has an endowment m h s of money, 8s 2 S and commercial banks have initial capital endowment e b s , 8s 2 S , part of which may be held in cash or deposits at the Central Bank. Second, when the Central Bank lends in the interbank market, or purchases bonds with currency or the government engages in money …nanced …scal transfers, then the money stock increases. Third, previously issued Central Bank bonds, or interbank loans, are repaid; money then exits the system via redemptions of debt from investors and from commercial banks.
Agents are permitted to borrow from, and deposit with, each particular commercial bank. However, borrowers are distributed initially to a particular bank from which they borrow. This may be a result of relationship banking, or some other informational advantage that a commercial bank has with particular borrowers. This restricted participation assumption generates di¤erent interest rates charged by commercial banks, but could be relaxed in more complicated versions of the model. 
where m b is the amount of credit that commercial banks extend which is also subject to their capital requirements set by the regulator (see section 2.6).
Thus, the ratio of nominal value of loans over loans supply (i.e. commercial banks credit extension) determines the gross nominal interest rate. We add that r b is the ex ante nominal interest rate that incorporates both the liquidity and default premia of loans since default is permitted in equilibrium. The e¤ective (ex post) interest is suitably adjusted to account for default on loans.
Similarly, there exist B deposit markets, one for each commercial bank, in which investors may deposit funds. Let b d be the amount of money that bank b 2 B chooses to owe in the consumer deposit market and d h b the amount of deposits that each h 2 H supplies with each b 2 B: If all deposits are repaid fully by commercial banks, then 8b 2 B we must have that
The deposit rates need not be the same as the lending rate since the parties involved in each market will, in principle, manifest di¤erent default patterns in equilibrium. Moreover, even though we have removed the limited participation assumption, deposit rates would in general be di¤erent since di¤erent banks may make di¤erent choices as to their respective repayment rates. Thus, as with lending rates, the deposit rates would also incorporate default and liquidity premia in equilibrium.
These …nancial assets, bank loans, bank deposits, and bank equities (but not commodities) can be inventoried; they are the only stores of value in our model.
Capital Requirements
As already mentioned in section 2.1, the regulator sets the banks' minimum capital requirements. Given that the assets of commercial banks consist of loans (including interest rate payments), investments in marketable assets and some initial distribution of government bonds, the capital requirements constraint becomes,
; 8s 2 S ; b 2 B
The variables are de…ned as follows: Capital requirements are set by the regulators at each t 2 T; 8b 2 B: However, evaluation of the capital and the risk-weighted assets occurs at each state's, s 2 S; prices, delivery rates, initial capital endowments and capital adjustments. Banks may not necessarily hold the same capital since precautionary capital over and above the regulatory minimum can vary across banks. In addition, as we will describe in the next section, banks are allowed to violate the capital requirements constraints, subject to a penalty payment.
Note that capital requirements in the …rst period are calculated with respect to the realised asset deliveries in the ex post equilibrium and not to the expected ex ante ones as in t = 0 (i.e. repayment rates are set equal to one). The impact of regulatory policy, since it a¤ects credit extension and banks'portfolio composition, is akin to the workings of monetary policy.
Finally, our modelling of capital requirements implicitly implies that whenever repayment rates are higher, other things constant, risk-weighted assets increase and thus capital requirements deteriorate; and one may wonder whether this is realistic. Since our model is a two period model, bank pro…ts are distributed back to the shareholders (NBPS) at the end of second period. However, risk-weighted assets of banks may rise in the …rst period due to the increased expected repayment rates. Thus, their investment rates in the loan and asset markets increase and therefore the riskiness of their portfolio rises. We note that had we extended our current framework to a multi-period setting, then, under a market value accounting system, our speci…cation is accurate. It captures the idea that on a mark-to-market basis, assets grow faster than pro…ts after a good shock and, therefore, the regulator tries to restrain the ensuing increase in the banks portfolio riskiness. 7 
Default
Default can be either strategic or due to ill fortune. Lenders cannot distinguish whether default (or equivalently capital requirements constraints'violation) occurs because the debtors are unable to honour their contractual obligations or they choose not to do so even though they have the necessary resources. The default (or capital requirements' violation) penalties are proportional to the level of default (or violation). Their purpose is to induce debtors to honour their obligation when they are able to do so and to refrain from making promises that they know they will not honour in the future.
Let us de…ne
is the vector of repayment rates by households (banks) (see sections 3.1 and 3.2 below). D h sz is the nominal value of debt under default in the credit markets (analogously in the asset market, or on deposit and interest rate obligations). In practice, default penalties and the bankruptcy code depend normally on the nominal values of debt and are only adjusted at discrete intervals as the general level of prices increases. In the model, nominal values are de ‡ated so that penalties are real. Finally, note that households are not allowed to default on their obligations either in the primary or secondary equity markets of commercial banks.
Let the parameters h sz ( b sz ) represent the marginal disutility of defaulting for each 'real' dollar on liabilities in state s. 8 Therefore, the payo¤s to investors and commercial banks will be respectively 8s 2 S ;
where g s is the base basket of goods which serves as a price de ‡ator with respect to which the bankruptcy penalty is measured, p s is the vector of commodity prices, and
Note that since we allow commercial banks to violate their capital requirement constraints,
represents the marginal disutility of violating their capital requirement constraint for each 'real'dollar. Thus, we need to subtract from the payo¤ of commercial banks the corresponding penalty. If b kt = +1; 8b 2 B, then commercial banks would never violate their capital adequacy ratios.
This speci…cation of default, and analogously for capital requirement violations, captures the idea (…rst introduced by Shubik and Wilson (1977) ) that utility decreases monotonically in the level of default. In equilibrium, agents equalise the marginal utility of defaulting with the marginal disutility of the bankruptcy penalty. 9 Thus, the expected rates of delivery of interbank and commercial loans, assets and deposits R = (R b s ; R h s ; R sj ; R b sd ) 8s 2 S; j 2 J and b 2 B are equal to actual rates of delivery in equilibrium. This is a crucial ingredient of this model. It allows us to establish default as an equilibrium phenomenon and produces di¤erent interest rates in each credit market. Di¤erent interest rates are produced because di¤erent risk attitudes and initial capital endowments of both individual borrowers and commercial banks induce di¤erent default levels that in turn generate di¤erent default risk premia in each credit market.
Commodity Markets
Commodity prices p sl are taken as exogenously given by the agents. Let b h sl amount of …at money spent by h 2 H to trade in the market of commodity sl 2 S L. In addition, let q h sl amount of good l 2 L o¤ered for sales at state s 2 S by h 2 H: Agents cannot sell commodities they do not own, so q h sl e h sl . In equilibrium, at positive levels of trade 0 < p sl < 1;
All markets meet simultaneously; hence cash obtained from the sale of commodity l at state s cannot be used for the purchase of another commodityl 2 L at some s 2 S . This institutional arrangement is a fundamental feature of a model that captures the importance of liquidity constraints and the transaction demand for cash. Cash-in-advance constraints should be viewed as liquidity constraints that distinguish commodities from liquid wealth. Without loss of generality, one could extend the present model to accommodate di¤erent liquidity characteristics of commodities, or of other assets, by introducing liquidity parameters for each commodity that would be determined in equilibrium. 10 
Commercial Banks
Commercial banks enter the model because of their importance both for enabling agents to smooth consumption, for the transmission of monetary policy, and most importantly for contagion of …nancial crises during periods of …nancial fragility.
Let b 2 B be the set of commercial banks. We assume:
(A8) perfectly competitive banking sector (i.e. commercial banks take interest rates and asset prices as exogenously given)
Although each bank has a group of borrowers allocated to it in this model, we could think of each bank as a set of similar competitive banks of the same type.
The balance sheet of commercial banks is as follows: The modelling of banking behaviour here is akin to the portfolio balance approach of the banking …rm introduced by Tobin (1963 Tobin ( , 1982 .
Shares of ownership of commercial banks are determined on a prorated manner as follows:
where, As can be seen from the time structure of the model, at t = 1, 8s 2 S, retrading occurs and the secondary bank equity market clears as follows: Also, s h sb s h b (i.e. no short sales of bank equity, for the sake of simplicity). Note that dividends are not distributed at the end of t = 0: At t = 1; the pro…ts (if any) of commercial banks are liquidated and distributed back to the individual owners according to their ownership shares. This way we close the model. We also remark that, because of the capital requirements' violation penalty, banks will never go bankrupt and therefore bank equity prices will be nonzero. The formal existence argument is presented in section 5.
Finally, as will be discussed in section 6, we analyse not only the default channel and liquidity trap for the banking system, but also the e¤ect on …nancial fragility of a collapse in bank equity values.
Interbank Credit Market
The Central Bank conducts its monetary policy through OMOs in the interbank market, (though other routes for OMOs are also possible in practice). Also, interbank lending and borrowing occur in this market. Alternatively, the Central Bank could set the interbank interest rate and accommodate the ensuing excess demand (or supply) of liquidity.
The interbank interest rate is established in equilibrium at positive levels of trade, Note that monetary policy is not symmetric since default can lead to varying responses to the Central Bank's OMOs actions. Also, the Central Bank could determine the interest rate instead and let borrowing and lending equilibrate the market, as the current practice of implementing monetary policy is nowadays.
The Budget Set
It is assumed that commodities are perishable, lasting only one period, and that each market meets once in each period. In order to ensure that agents have the necessary liquidity before they spend the order in which markets meet should be carefully chosen. Accordingly, the interbank market meets …rst to enable commercial banks to acquire funds to supply in the credit markets which in turn meet before commodity markets meet to allow investors to borrow, if necessary, for their expenditures. However, if the time horizon is extended to a large T the order does not very much matter as long as receipts from sales cannot be used contemporaneously for the purchase of commodities.
As in Tsomocos (2003a, b), we assume that asset markets (as well as the banks' equity market) clear automatically via a giant clearing house. Thus,we attempt to capture the fact that …nancial markets clear faster than commodity markets.
Investors
Macro variables ( = (p; ; r; ; s; R)) are determined in equilibrium and every agent takes them as given. Agents are perfect competitors and therefore are price takers. The choice of investors, h 2 H; are determined by h 2 P h ( ) where,
is the vector of all of investors'decisions.
belowg is the budget set where 4(i) represents the di¤erence between RHS and LHS of inequality (i):
(1 h ) (i.e. expenditures for assets, banks' equity in the primary market, and commodities + bank deposits borrowed money at the credit markets + receipts from sales of assets + initial private monetary endowments).
sales of commodities endowments of commodities).
h 0l
(i.e. consumption initial endowment -sales + purchases).
(i.e. expenditures for commodities and banks' equity in the secondary market money at hand + receipts from sales of commodities + receipts from sales of banks' equity in the secondary market + initial private monetary endowment in states s).
(i.e. asset and loan deliveries money at hand + receipts from commodities sales + distribution of commercial banks'pro…ts + deposit and interest payment + asset deliveries). (i.e. deposits in the interbank market receipts from banks' primary equity market + initial capital endowment).
Commercial banks
(i.e. credit extension + expenditures for assets money at hand + interbank loans + receipts from asset sales + consumer deposits). 8s 2 S; 3.3 A Remark on Cash-In-Advance A common criticism of the cash-in-advance (C-I-A) 11 models is that these constraints are ad hoc and do not adequately capture liquidity. Our view is that C-I-A constraints are the simplest form of liquidity constraints and can be straightforwardly generalised to model more complicated liquidity constraints (or collateral requirements). The main intuition of these constraints is that the di¤erent instruments and commodities of the economy are not equally liquid. Put di¤erently, not all receipts from sales can be contemporaneously used for other purchases. As long as there exist some liquidity parameters for the commodity endowment which are less than 1 (otherwise, the budget constraints collapse to the standard ArrowDebreu constraints), money (or liquidity or credit) demand is positive in order to bridge the gap between expenditures and receipts. Indeed, Grandmont and Younes (1972) have used these liquidity parameters. However, the pure C-I-A constraint o¤ers accounting clarity and ease of exposition (see section 7).
Equilibrium
We say that 12 
Condition (i) shows that all commodity markets clear (or equivalently that price expectations are rational).
(ii) 1 + =
shows that the interbank credit market clears (or equivalently that interbank interest rate forecasts are rational).
shows that the long-term credit markets clear (or equivalently that prediction of the long-term interest rate is rational).
; 8b 2 B; h 2 H; Condition (iv) shows that the deposit markets for each bank clear (or equivalently that prediction of the deposit rates is rational).
Condition (v) shows that every asset market clears (or equivalently, asset price expectations are rational).
(
Condition (vii) shows that the secondary equity market of commercial banks clears (or equivalently secondary market bank equity price expectations are rational.)
; 8s 2 S; j 2 J:
Condition (viii) shows that each asset buyer is correct in his expectations about the fraction of assets that will be delivered to him.
Conditions (ix)-(xi) show that the Central Bank and commercial banks are correct in their expectations about the fraction of loans that will be delivered to them. Similarly, investors and commercial banks are correct in their expectations about the fraction of deposits and interest rate payments that will be delivered to them.
Condition (xii) shows that all agents optimise. In sum, all markets clear, expectations are rational and agents optimise given their budget sets. These are the de…ning properties of a competitive equilibrium.
Orderly Functioning of Markets: Existence of a Monetary Equilibrium with Commercial Banks and Default
If a MECBD exists, then default and …nancial instability manifest themselves as equilibrium phenomena entirely consistent with the proper functioning of markets. Thus, if any of these phenomena are deemed detrimental for the economy and for the welfare of the society, then regulatory intervention may be justi…ed. Moreover, active crisis management and prevention can become necessary. As can be seen from conditions (viii)-(xi) of section 4, expected deliveries of assets, loans and deposits are equal to realised deliveries in equilibrium. However, the speci…cation of expectations for inactive markets is 'arbitrary'. Thus, we need a hypothesis to rule out trivial equilibrium (in which trade in the corresponding markets collapses). Following Tsomocos (2003a, b) we impose the Inactive Market Hypothesis.
Inactive Market Hypothesis (IMH): Whenever credit or asset markets are inactive the corresponding rates of delivery are set equal to 1.
This hypothesis follows closely Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2000), and Dubey and Shubik (1978) that allow an external agent to be added in these markets that always supplies an " amount and never abrogates his contractual obligations. It may be thought as the FDIC or an analogous institution.
Economic agents in our model are not required to trade and they always have the option to consume their own endowment. This situation arises when interest rates are prohibitively high and thus there is no demand for credit. Then, it also becomes uncertain whether the interbank market will be active as well. This happens whenever the marginal cost of borrowing (i.e. interest rate payments) is higher than the marginal bene…t of the extra consumption.
We are thus naturally led to adopt a condition that guarantees su¢ cient gains from trade. For an extensive discussion on this issue see Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) permits at least gains-from-trades in state s if there exist trades 1 ; :::; H ; 1 ; :::; B in R L+1 such that
Note that when > 0; We are now ready to state the existence theorem that establishes default and …nancial fragility compatible with equilibrium and the orderly functioning of markets. Note that the existence theorem also resolves the 'Hahn paradox' (1965) whereby money has no-value in …nite horizon.
Theorem:
If in the economy E = f(u h ; e h ; m h ) h2H ; (u b ; e b ) b2B ; A; M CB ; CB ; m CB ; k; ; !g 1. G from T and IMH hold, 2. M CB > 0; 3. 8s 2 S ; P
e b s > 0 and 4. >> 0; 8h 2 H; b 2 B then a MECBD exists. 13 6 Financial Fragility, Default and the Liquidity Trap
Financial Fragility and Contagion: Concepts and De…nitions
We adopt a de…nition of …nancial fragility introduced in Tsomocos (2003a, b) , where a MECBD is …nancially fragile whenever a substantial 'number' of households and commercial banks default on some of their obligations (i.e. a liquidity 'crisis'), without necessarily becoming bankrupt, and the aggregate pro…tability of the banking sector decreases signi…cantly (i.e. a banking 'crisis').
The formal de…nition of …nancial fragility is as follows; ; for jH j + jB j Z, and s 2 S where Z 2 (0; jHj + jBj) and
This de…nition requires both increased default and reduced aggregate pro…tability. Increased default by itself might indicate excessive risk taking without necessarily engendering a serious strain on the …nancial sector of the economy, whereas a decrease in pro…tability by itself might indicate the onset of a recession in the real economy and not of …nancial vulnerability. Also, with heterogeneous agents, the welfare of society depends not only on aggregate outcomes, but also on their distribution over agents. This de…nition explicitly hinges upon the welfare of the economy and its distributional consequences since our model is multi-agent.
The …rst channel of contagion is the one generated by increased default in a speci…c sector of the economy. For example, if a speci…c bank charges exobitantly high interest rates on its clients then their subsequent default impacts upon the rest of the economy. Commercial banks reduce their repayment rates in the interbank market and investors and/or commercial banks abrogate their obligation in the asset markets. Alternatively, the commodity markets may be a¤ected either through reduced supply (or demand) which in turn a¤ects expected income of the household sector (or the supplier). The upshot of this chain of contagion is that reduced liquidity hurts the lenders whose income (or equivalently their expenditures) is reduced, thus decreasing their consumption and welfare. We note that this chain may be broken, for example, with emergency liquidity assistance that neutralises the reduced loan repayment rate to the initial commercial bank. The same reasoning applies for contagion through the interbank market's increased default.
Second, contagion may commence through the collapse of the banking sector's equity value in the secondary market. Since the distribution of pro…ts to investors is determined by the shares of ownership as they are speci…ed in the secondary banks' equity market, weakness of the banking sector is translated to investors' income. Reduced expected pro…tability of the banking sector will be re ‡ected in a reduced value of the shares of ownership of banks' equity and thus the reduced income will lower such agents'repayment rates of loans and asset deliveries. For example, if bank b's equity drops in value then its investors will increase their default in the rest of the economy which will adversely a¤ect other agents' welfare as well, who transact with them in the asset market. Finally, the last channel of contagion which will be discussed in section 6.2 is generated by a possible ine¤ectiveness of monetary policy. As monetary policy eases without a¤ecting the real side of the economy (i.e. we enter a liquidity trap), the extra liquidity in ‡ates activity in some asset markets. This in turn leads commercial banks to violate excessively their capital requirements which adversely a¤ects their pro…tability and subsequently their equity value. Through the investor sector's ownership of bank shares contagion spreads outside the banking sector and may reduce welfare in the rest of the economy.
Liquidity Trap
The Keynesian liquidity trap describes a situation in which monetary policy would not a¤ect real expenditures in the economy. If interest rates are su¢ ciently low and investors expect them to rise in the future, then they do not invest into assets like bonds whose value is expected to fall. Thus, they hold the extra money balances due to expansionary monetary policy for speculative purposes without a¤ecting commodity prices. Various authors provide models that allow for the occurrence of a liquidity trap (e.g. Tobin (1963 Tobin ( , 1982 , Grandmont and Laroque (1976) , and Hool (1976) ). Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) provide a novel interpretation of this phenomenon. They argue that in a monetary GEI model, as monetary policy eases, then commodity prices remain una¤ected whereas the extra liquidity is channeled into asset market(s) where trading activity becomes large. However, in the aggregate there is almost no new net trading activity in such asset markets. This possibility is non-generic, and occurs only in an equilibrium where the corresponding real GEI economy possesses no equilibrium (i.e. the case of the Hart (1975) counterexample).
Unlike Tsomocos (2003a, b) , in the present model, the same phenomenon reappears, (coupled with …nancial fragility), even when capital requirements are binding. The liquidity trap may still be present via excessive trading activity in equity markets. Banks now switch to credit extension and consumers spend in the primary bank equity market (thus helping to satisfy the capital requirements of banks). Alternatively, in anticipation of a higher liquidation value of commercial banks, consumers restructure their portfolio of banks'equity in the secondary market. However, note that this is a non-generic case and occurs only when equilibrium fails to exist in the underlying real GEI economy. The next proposition summarises this intuition.
Proposition 1
Suppose that the economy has a riskless asset A j sm = (1; :::; 1) (i.e. monetary payo¤s in every state are equal to one) and A j sl = 0; 8s 2 S and l 2 L for k t = 0: Also, consider the case in which the underlying economy has no GEI. Then as M CB ! 1, then 
Regulatory Policy and Default
Since both default and capital requirements' violations incur a cost, consumers and banks weigh the marginal costs and bene…ts of abrogating their contractual or regulatory obligation. Thus, for su¢ ciently high penalties, default and capital requirements' violations vanish in equilibrium. We therefore observe the importance of capital requirements for …nancial stability. For example, whenever credit is fully collateralised, the regulator guarantees future …nancial stability. This, however, has an opportunity cost since the resulting higher interest rates due to stricter capital requirements would reduce e¢ cient trade.
In sum, we note that at least one aspect of the well-known trade-o¤ between …nancial stability and e¢ ciency is present and this indicates the interconnectedness of monetary and regulatory policies. Since agents may opt to default or violate their capital requirements in equilibrium, changes in regulatory practice a¤ect their marginal rates of substitution among various choices and thus produce equilibria with di¤erent allocations, as the following proposition indicates. The model is liquidity based with well-de…ned transaction technology and settlement processes; therefore both real changes as well as changes of the nominal constraints have a necessarily non-neutral e¤ect.
We de…ne a MECBD to be bank-indecomposable if for any partition of assets into disjoint sets 1 and 2 there is some b 2 B who transacts in at least one asset from each set. 
Modigliani-Miller Proposition
The modeling of commercial banks that have diverse …nancing and investment opportunities sheds light on the Modigliani-Miller proposition. The traditional argument for the validity of the irrelevance of …nancing rests on perfect and frictionless capital markets. Various arguments such as limited liability, bankruptcy costs and di¤erential taxation between debt and equity have been o¤ered to invalidate this proposition.
In the present model, only when (i) markets are complete, (ii) limited participation does not produce di¤erent borrowing behaviour, and (iii) banks'risk taking behaviour, and capital requirements are identical, then …nancing does not matter. Put di¤erently, only when we remove all the frictions of the model and also impose homogeneity across banks, do we recover the Modigliani-Miller proposition. When one models active banks with diversi…ed portfolios, not only lack of frictions but also identical investments guarantee the validity of the irrelevance proposition.
As our next proposition shows, any deviation from these principles destroys the symmetry of debt-equity …nancing. First, limited participation, even for banks with identical …nancing, creates di¤erent returns from credit extension, and thus changes the value of banks in t = 1: Second, even if all other variables remain the same across banks, di¤erent risk-appetites lead them to form di¤erent portfolios. Given di¤erential returns amongst the various investments 14 , banks'preferences towards risk generate di¤erent terminal values for banks'portfolios. 15 Third, di¤erent capital requirements and/or risk-weights provide di¤erent incentives to banks when forming their portfolios provided that the capital requirements'violation penalties are transferable to banks' shareholders. Otherwise, it may very well be the case that the penalty is internalised by banks management who still form identical portfolios and thus generate equal pro…ts. Thus, the forces of demand and supply will typically equilibrate the markets so that banks'equity will trade at di¤erent prices in the secondary equity market. This may be relevant for analysing the impact of the New Basel Accord.
Finally, even in the absence of the previous frictions but with incomplete markets, i.e. jJj < jSj, di¤erent …nancing alters the space of marketed assets and therefore produces di¤erent equilibria and consequently di¤erent values for banks. In other words, this is akin to the distinction of comparing within an equilibrium two di¤erent …nancing structures that produce identical payo¤s and across di¤erent equilibria of a bank that changes its …nancing. In the …rst instance, value is not a¤ected, whereas in the second it is. If two di¤erent …nancing schemes have the same payo¤s, in an equilibrium, then the corresponding values of the banks will be the same by a standard no-arbitrage argument. However, if one bank changes its …nancing then the monetary payo¤s of its assets in the new equilibrium will typically be di¤erent, given incomplete markets and limited liability. This distinction holds only when markets are incomplete; otherwise since the space of marketed assets does not change, the two cases are equivalent. 1 4 Recall, there is limited liability and active default in equilibrium. Also, equity is default free, whereas debt (either through interbank or credit market loans) is defaultable. 1 5 This point has also been discussed extensively by King (1977) .
Proposition 4
(iii) Regulation: Let either [0; k
be transferable to banks' shareholders. If both
In sum, the Modigliani-Miller principle is violated primarily from two sources. First, when structural frictions such as limited participation and market incompleteness are present. Second, when investment behaviour of active banks is a¤ected by di¤erent incentives or di¤erent attitudes towards risk.
Money Demand, Interest Rates, and the Non-Neutrality of Monetary Policy
The monetary/…nancial sector of our simple speci…cation of the economy, coupled with its transaction technology, produces the traditional motives for holding money. Thus, we observe that the standard Hicksian determinants of money demand are present in the model. In particular, liquidity provision by banks and default by both banks and households produce an intricate relationship among interest rates. Since base money is …at and the horizon is …nite 16 , in the end money exits the system. This means that both central bank money, M CB (i.e. inside money) and money and liquidity present in the initial endowments of banks and households (i.e. outside money) would exit the system either via loan repayments to commercial banks or to the Central Bank by the commercial banks. Thus, the overall liquidity of the economy a¤ects the determination of interest rates. Moreover, endogenous default is possible in equilibrium and inevitably a¤ects interest rates as well. In sum, both a liquidity and default premium a¤ects interest rates. However, further structural assumptions are needed to be able to disentangle these term premia.
Liquidity Structure of Interest Rates Proposition:
In any MECBD, 8s 2 S;
In our multi-period setting, if jBj > jSj+1 then there are more interest rates than equations. Thus, they depend on the real data of the economy and are subject to policy intervention. The only exception is when m h s = e b s = 0; 8s 2 S ; h 2 H; b 2 B and v b s =ṽ b s = R sj = R h s = R b s = 1; 8s 2 S ; h 2 H; b 2 B. In such a case, all interest rates are zero (including ) and money is essentially a veil. 17 1 6 Had we used an in…nite horizon model, as long as there is settlement and liquidation in regular time intervals, similar results would hold. 1 7 Moreover, if banks are not active in the asset markets or are net sellers of assets, the proposition reduces
Monetary policy is transmitted to the economy through the interbank market via credit extension by commercial banks in the consumer credit markets. Thus, banks portfolio decisions as well as default in the interbank and consumer credit markets determine the credit spread between lending and deposit interest rates and the money multiplier in the economy.
If all interest rates are positive, then all the available liquidity will be channeled in the commodity markets 8s 2 S: However, this is not the case at s = 0 because of uncertainty and incomplete markets, investors may opt to spend it in the asset markets or hold some precautionary reserves.
Quantity Theory of Money Proposition:
In any MECBD with > 0;
For s = 0;
This is no 'crude' quantity theory of money. Velocity will always be less than or equal to 1 (one if all interest rates are positive). However, since quantities supplied in the markets are chosen by agents (unlike the representative agent model's sell-all assumption), the real velocity of money, that is how many real transactions can be moved by money per unit of time, is endogenous.
The interest rates determined in equilibrium are in nominal terms. Thus, they depend not only on the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, but also on the in ‡ation rate of the economy. So, the well known Fisher relation holds, as is argued in the next proposition.
Fisher E¤ect Proposition:
Suppose that for some h 2 H b ; b h 0l and b h sl > 0 for l 2 L and s 2 S: Suppose further that h has some money left over the moment that the loan comes due at s 2 S: Then in a MECBD,
Taking the logarithm of both sides and interpreting loosely, this says that the nominal rate of interest is equal to the real rate of interest plus the (expected) rate of in ‡ation.
As in the case with regulatory policy, monetary policy also has non-neutral e¤ects. As it is proved in Tsomocos (2001) , MECBD are …nite with respect to both real allocations and nominal variables. Thus, any monetary change (except the one mentioned in the remark after proposition 5) a¤ects interest rates and therefore economic agents' decisions. Finally, since MECBD are typically constrained ine¢ cient, policy changes do not necessarily a¤ect welfare and …nancial stability monotonically.
We de…ne a MECBD to be investors-indecomposable if for any s 2 S any partition of goods into disjoint sets L 1 and L 2 there is some h 2 H who transacts in at least one commodity from each set in s 2 S :
Proposition 5
Suppose that all u h ; u b are di¤erentiable and m h s ; e b s > 0 or b < b and h < h for all h 2 H; b 2 B and s 2 S : Suppose at an indecomposable MECBD at every s 2 S all h 2 H consume positive amounts of all goods l 2 L and that some h 2 H carries over money from period 0 to 1. Then any change by the Central Bank (except the one described in the remark) results in a di¤erent MECBD in which for some h 2 H consumption is di¤erent.
Remark: The 'no money illusion'property holds in the model. A proportional increase of all the nominal endowments of the consumers and commercial banks while k stays …xed and penalties are scaled down proportionally does not a¤ect the real variables of MECBD.
Application
In this section we specialise the general model presented earlier to the case of three households and two banks, where the time horizon extends over two periods (t 2 f0; 1g) and three possible states (s 2 f1; 2; 3g) in the …rst period. One bank, bank , is relatively poor at t = 0 and therefore has to seek external funds to …nance its loans to its nature-selected borrower, Mr. : Bank can raise its funds either by borrowing from the interbank or the deposit markets. Bank 's assets comprise only of its credit extension to the consumer loan market. This way we can focus on the e¤ects of policies on banks that cannot quickly restructure their portfolios, perhaps due to inaccessibility of capital and asset markets, during periods of …nancial adversity. The other bank, bank , is a relatively rich commercial bank. In addition to its lending activities to its nature-selected borrower, Mr. , its portfolio consists of deposits in the interbank market. Bank 's richer portfolio allows it to diversify quickly and more e¢ ciently than bank . Mr.
and Mr. are poor in terms of their commodity endowment at t = 0, and therefore have to borrow money from banks and , respectively, to buy commodities. As they are rich at t = 1; they sell commodities in the three states of period 1. On the other hand, Mr. is rich in t = 0 and poor in t = 1 (both in terms of commodity and monetary endowments):
We allow endogenous defaults in the interbank market, i.e. bank can default on its interbank loans. Furthermore, Mr. has a choice to deposit his money with either bank. To distinguish between bank 's and bank 's deposits, we assume that the relatively riskier bank, bank , can default on its borrowing from the deposit market. Finally, we assume that the cost of default in the interbank and deposit markets is quadratic. This in turn implies that the marginal cost of default in these markets increases as the size of borrowing becomes larger.
Formally, the agents'payo¤ functions can be described as follows;
where c h s ; 8s 2 S ; h 2 H are parameters in the agents utility functions. Given the chosen set of exogenous parameters/variables, we solve the agents'optimisation problems using a version of Newton's method and obtain the initial MECBD. We then conduct a series of comparative statics by perturbing each of the exogenous parameters/variables. However, as the purpose of this section is merely to illustrate how the general model developed in this paper can be applied to analyse the issue of …nancial fragility in practice, we only report the result of one comparative statics below. The fully-analysed application of the general model which also involves a variation of specialisation of the general model can be found in the companion paper, Goodhart et al. (2004a) . Moreover, the full description of the agents' optimisation problems, the chosen value of exogenous parameters and the initial equilibrium used in this section can be found op: cit:
Expansionary Monetary Policy
Let the Central Bank engage in expansionary monetary policy by increasing the money supply in the interbank market (or equivalently lowering the interbank market rate). Due to the lower cost of funds in the interbank market, bank extends more credit to Mr. and thus its lending rate decreases. Also, it restructures its liability side by reducing its deposit demand, thus lowering r d . In turn, Mr.
increases his deposits with bank whose deposit rate now also falls. Consequently, bank expands its credit extension and deposits in the interbank market.
Given more liquidity in the economy, by the quantity theory of money proposition, all prices increase. So, the expected income of Mr. and increases and so do their repayment rates. This could also have been predicted by the liquidity structure of interest rate proposition since expansionary monetary policy generates increased liquidity.
With respect to the welfare e¤ects of expansionary monetary policy, as expected, the household sector bene…ts from lower borrowing cost. However, lower deposit rates adversely a¤ect Mr. whose welfare decreases. Finally, banks' pro…ts are lower since the higher repayment rates are compensated by the capital requirements' violation penalties they incur since their risk-weighted assets increase. Capital requirements worsen because the e¤ect of higher credit extension and higher repayment rates dominate the bene…cial e¤ect of lower lending rates.
In sum, monetary policy has ambiguous welfare and pro…t e¤ects depending on the state of the economic cycle. While the impact on borrowers is typically positive, the e¤ect on investors and …nancial intermediaries depends on their portfolio and the regulatory regimes in which they operate.
Additional Results
In Goodhart et. al (2004a), we explain in detail other relevant experiments, e.g. a change in household commodity and monetary endowment, a change in risk weight on loans etc. However, in this subsection we highlight some of the main lessons that can be drawn from them. First, in an adverse economic environment, expansionary monetary policy can aggravate …nancial fragility since the extra liquidity injected by the Central Bank may be used by certain banks to 'gamble for resurrection', worsening their capital position, and therefore the overall …nancial stability of the economy. Thus, a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and …nancial stability need not exist only for regulatory policies, but also for monetary policy.
Second, agents which have more investment opportunities can deal with negative shocks more e¤ectively by using their ‡exibility in quickly restructuring their investment portfolios as a means of transferring 'negative externalities'to other agents with a more restricted set of investment opportunities. This result has various implications. Among others, banks which have no well-diversi…ed portfolios tend to follow a countercyclical credit extension policy in face of a negative regulatory shock in the loan market (e.g. tighter loan risk weights). In contrast, banks which can quickly restructure their portfolio tend to reallocate their portfolio away from the loan market, thus following a procyclical credit extension policy. 18 Moreover, regulatory policies which are selectively targeted at di¤erent groups of banks can produce very non-symmetric results. When the policy is aimed at banks which have more investment opportunities, much less contagion e¤ect to the rest of the economy is observed since those banks simply restructure their portfolios between interbank and asset markets without greatly perturbing the credit market, and therefore interest rates and prices in the economy. On the contrary, when the same policy is targeted at banks which have relatively limited investment opportunities, they are forced to 'bite the bullet' by altering their credit extension. This produces changes in a series of interest rates, and therefore the cost of borrowing for agents. This in turn produces a contagion e¤ect to the real sector in the economy.
Thirdly, an improvement such as a positive productivity shock, which is concentrated in one part of the economy, can worsen that for others. The key reason for this lies in the fact that our model has heterogeneous agents and distributional e¤ects therefore operate through various feedback channels among various sectors in the economy which all are active in equilibrium.
Finally, increasing the endowment of banks produces much the same result as increasing their corresponding capital violation penalties, particularly in regards to its contagion e¤ects to the rest of the economy. Thus, a direct injection of emergency recapitalisation funds to banks is, to a certain extent, substitutable by increasing the banks'capital violation penalties.
Concluding Remarks
In reality, the economic system is both complex and heterogeneous. In order to model it in a way that is both mathematically tractable, rigorous, and yet simple enough to be illuminating, economists have tended to assume homogeneity amongst agents in the sectors involved. Unfortunately that prevents analysis of certain key features of the real world, especially those relating to interbank interactions and …nancial fragility.
We have sought to focus on such interactive channels. That has inevitably raised the complexity of our modelling; however we have tried to limit such complexity by adopting an exchange economy with just endowed consumers and banks, (no …rms, no external sector, no other …nancial intermediaries, a black-box o¢ cial sector).
We see this paper as the start of a major programme to use models such as this for the analysis of …nancial fragility. 19 We shall stick to two main principles; …rst, heterogeneity is essential; second our approach to modelling default and liquidity is the best available modelling strategy. Otherwise we hope to examine a wide range of alternative structures.
The main challenges ahead will be, …rst to represent a complex reality in a manner that is both illuminating and yet re ‡ects that reality, and second to be able to draw general conclusions from an array of models that may, each individually, be sensitive to their individual particularities. This paper is the …rst step in our planned programme.
10 Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Theorem
The proof follows mutatis mutandis from Tsomocos (2003a, b). We will here provide the parts that are di¤erent.
First, we need to extend the strategy spaces as follows: 
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Let M CB ! 1 and assume that ( P h2H q h j + P b2B q b j ) 9 1: Then by choosing subsequences and further subsequences select a subsequence along which all relative 's and 's converge.
Thus, the limit of the last subsequence coincides with a GEI, a contradiction. Also by feasibility, M CB = k j k ! 1 and therefore (iii) Assume now that P h2H h b < +1: Then again by choosing subsequences and further subsequences select a subsequence along which all relative 's and 's converge. Again the limit of this subsequence yields a MECBD that coincides with a GEI, a contradiction. Thus, P If LHS > RHS then b could have borrowed " j more on the interbank market, bought " units more of asset j, sold (" j = j 0 )(1 + ) more units of asset j 0 to defray its loan and improve its pro…ts. Alternatively, if LHS < RHS, then b should have spent " j less on asset j, thus borrowing " j less from the interbank market, sold (" j = j 0 )(1 + ) less of asset j 0 improving its pro…ts. Note that this last option is feasible by (2 b ). Now consider a change in k. Suppose asset investments remain the same. Then either m b or d b should change to satisfy the new capital requirements. If m b changes then the argument follows the proof of proposition 5. If d b changes then market clearing requires to change as well. For pro…ts to remain unchanged, by indecomposability some b is buying as well as selling, some assets, say, j and j 0 . Thus ( j = j 0 ) should fall. But then j should have a seller who buys another j 00 . So, ( j 0 = j 00 ) must also fall. Thus, we arrive out some b j which has already been mentioned, and then ( j = j 0 )( j 0 = j 00 ):::( j = j ) = 1 should be falling, a contradiction. In the case of default, the previous argument is strengthened since r b s ( s ( ); 8 s 2 S: Thus, all cash is returned to the commercial banks and the second equality follows 8s 2 S (for s = 0 cash may be transferred for use in the beginning of the next period). Finally, at t = 1 banks are liquidated to their shareholders, so the …rst part of the proposition follows.
Proof of Quantity Theory of Money Proposition
Banks that hold idle cash, say 4, either they could have deposited it in the interbank market, extend it in the credit market or invest it in the asset market and improve their payo¤ by at least r b s ( b s )4 > 0: Otherwise, they could have reduced their borrowing from the interbank market and thus save 4 interest repayment. Likewise, households if they are borrowers will spend all of their cash; or else they should not have borrowed. If r b = 0; 8b 2 B; still h should not have borrowed thus letting some b deposit with the interbank market and improve pro…ts by 4. This, would improve his payo¤ since P 
Proof of Fisher E¤ect Proposition
It follows immediately from the optimisation conditions.
Proof of Proposition 5
As in proposition 3, from the optimisation condition 8s 2 S and for some h 2 H; l; l Now consider a change in M CB (the same argument applies for changes in CB ). Let the case not covered in proposition 3 occur. By the liquidity structure of interest rate rates proposition r b changes. To maintain the same consumptions, using indecomposability, (p sl =p sl 0 )(p sl 0 =p sl 00 ):::(p sl =p sl ) =1, should be falling, a contradiction. A fortiori, if [D h sz ] + > 0 agents by reducing their borrowing by " and adjusting their consumption by "=p sl and p sl =p sl 0 accordingly to satisfy their …rst order conditions. In such a case, for high enough h sz , his net gain in utility, ( h sz r b r h s ( h sl )=p sl )" > 0:
Remark: Investors'indecomposability may be relaxed and then in case where the previous argument does not hold then liquidation of bank will necessarily leave some h with 4(5 h ) > 0:
